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Money laundering has become of increasing concern to law makers in recent years,
principally because of its associations with terrorism. Recent legislative changes in the
United Kingdom mean that auditors risk becoming state law enforcement agents in the
private sector. We examine this legislation from the perspective of the changing nature of
the relationship between auditors and the state, and the surveillant assemblage within
which this is located. Auditors are statutorily obliged to ﬁle Suspicious Activity Reports
(SARs) into an online database, ELMER, but without much guidance regarding how
suspicion is determined. Criminal rather than civil or regulatory sanctions apply to
auditors’ instances of non-compliance. This paper evaluates the surveillance implications
of the legislation for auditors through lenses developed in the accounting and sociological
literature by Brivot andGendron, Neu andHeincke, Deleuze and Guattari, and Haggerty and
Ericson. It ﬁnds that auditors are generating information ﬂows which are subsequently
reassembled into discrete and virtual ‘data doubles’ to be captured and utilised by
authorised third parties for unknown purposes. The paper proposes that the surveillant
assemblage has extended into the space of the auditor-client relationship, but this
extension remains inhibited as a result of auditors’ relatively weak level of engagement in
providing SARs, thereby pointing to a degree of resistance in professional service ﬁrms
regarding the deployment of regulation that compromises the foundations of this
relationship.
Crown Copyright © 2017 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the
CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The state deploys numerous technologies to regulate and oversee the behaviours of individuals, populations, and
professions, some ofwhich are direct and transparentwhile others are concealed (McKinlay & Starkey,1998; [86_TD$DIFF] Rose andMiller,
1992). The concealed technologies include the gathering of information by individuals such as auditors and solicitors,
institutions such as health authorities and welfare agencies, and its reporting to the state in fulﬁlment of legal obligations.
The provider of the information may not know the precise purpose for which it will be used; this may be for statistical
analysis, the allocation of tax resources (Miller & O’Leary, 1987), or, when criminality is suspected, to trigger further covert
surveillance by other state actors. Neu and Heincke (2004, p.181) observe that:
‘Technologies such as accounting, administration, and law serve to structure the conditions of possibility within a
particular institutional ﬁeld. These techniques not only frame potential problems within the ﬁeld, but also construct
possible solutions (Neu, 2000; Preston, Chua, & Neu, 1997). By [87_TD$DIFF]mobilizing distant knowledges and by transmitting thissevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
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distance’.
Neu and Hencke suggested that historically, as the state became more remote from those it governed because of the
increased complexity of economic affairs, its reliance upon constant ﬂows of information increased. The direct
punishment of offenders no longer sufﬁced, as those who facilitated criminality, directly or indirectly, also had to be
sanctioned. The traditional ‘touchstone’ in the auditor-client relationship, the duty of conﬁdentiality, also became subject
to statutory incursion as the state extended its reporting obligations regarding known or suspected criminal behaviour.
The difference between these two states of mind – knowledge and suspicion – challenges auditors when interacting with
the on-line reporting system. The main applicable legislation, the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA 2002 hereafter),
imposes a reporting obligation when there is ‘reasonable suspicion’ of criminality, but without providing a statutory
deﬁnition of what that means. Is suspicion to be determined objectively in relation to how an auditor’s peers would view a
client’s series of transactions, or subjectively, by reference to the facts as directly perceived or interpreted? This dichotomy
is embedded in the nomenclature of the reporting mechanism: the Suspicious Activity Report (SAR hereafter). POCA
2002 is principally aimed at the ﬁnancial services sector where ‘suspicion’ tends to be triggered by single, speciﬁc
transactions rather than by a ‘piecing together’ of a series of transactions which would be undertaken by a forensic
accountant. For example, the transfer of a large sum of money from an overseas jurisdiction where bribery and corruption
are prevalent will, ceteris paribus, trigger suspicion and the ﬁling of a report. Similarly, multiple small deposits made by
numerous individuals which accumu
late in one account (known as ‘smurﬁng’) will also generate suspicion. These so-called red ﬂags, amongst others, were
described in a report issued by the United Kingdom [89_TD$DIFF] inancial Conduct Authority [90_TD$DIFF] in July 2013. However, an accountant may
witness or be party to a series of ostensibly innocent transactions by a client which, with the beneﬁt of hindsight, can be
viewed as suspicious, thereby leading to a questioning of the accountant not having originally ﬁled a suspicious report.
The present paper extends the line of reasoning found inwork by Brivot andGendron (2011),Haggerty and Ericson (2000),
and Giddens (1985), that surveillance in some aspects of the auditor-state relationship has evolved into a diverse, rhizoid
structure (Hoskin, 1994). The networks of state agencies which have access to the database in which SARs are held, ELMER,
have diverse purposes for which the information may be used, and reﬂect this evolving assemblage (the database was so
named in honour of Elmer Lincoln Irey, the Director of the United States’ Internal Revenue Service’s lead investigation unit
during the federal tax evasion prosecution of Al Capone in 1931).
The paper addresses three questions. First, how has the traditional auditor-client relationship been affected by the new
statute-based surveillant assemblage? Second, what are the implications of the transformation of the traditional nexuses
between auditor, client, and state intowhat Benjamin (1983), and later, Haggerty and Ericson (2000) identify as a [102_TD$DIFF]‘multitude
of organized surveillance systems’? Third, to what extent are auditors engaged with the new reporting regime? The paper’s
methodology is principally theoretical, evaluating the implications for auditors of evolving state surveillance as manifested
in relevant provisions of POCA 2002. Its empirical dimension critiques the relevant sections of United Kingdom (UK
hereafter) anti-money laundering law to comprehend the implications of reporting obligations placed upon auditors, and its
apparent lack of clarity in how ‘reasonable suspicion’ is deﬁned. Statistical data produced by the National Crime Agency (NCA
hereafter) is utilised to explain the degree of reporting compliance by auditors.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section addresses a dichotomy: does the accounting profession facilitate
criminality such as money laundering, or assist in its prevention or detection? Section 3 describes how information
technologies create ‘data doubles’ of persons to be subsequently exchanged between and scrutinised by state agencies. The
section draws upon theoretical work by Brivot and Gendron (2011) to demonstrate how Foucault’s model of centralised
surveillance as described in Discipline and Punish: The birth of the prison (1977) has been displaced by a more diverse, rhizoid
surveillant assemblage, as discussed in the sociological work of Jessop (2007) and Deleuze and Guattari (1987). Section 4
critiques auditor reporting obligations under POCA 2002, describing technological failings and database inadequacies
currently holding back development of the surveillant assemblage. Statistical data provided by the NCA is drawn upon to
demonstrate howauditors have consistently and signiﬁcantly underperformed, year on year, most other reporting sectors in
terms of quantity of SARs ﬁled. Section 5 provides the paper’s conclusions.
2. Money laundering and the accounting profession: prevention or participation?
Money laundering may be deﬁned as the attempt to disguise the origin and nature of income derived from illegal
purposes and its subsequent integration into the ﬁnancial systemwithout attracting the attention of law enforcement or tax
collection authorities (Compin, 2008; Lehman & Okcabol, 2005). The academic literature is rich regarding the
interrelationship between the state and the accounting profession, and the reporting obligations imposed on the latter
by the former (Gendron, 2002; Guenin-Paracini & Gendron, 2010; Hines, 1989; Humphrey & Owen, 2000; Power, 1997). The
dichotomy in the auditor-state relationship relates to whether accounting is a means of detecting, preventing or deterring
money laundering, or if it participates in the crime, enabling and hiding it. The dichotomy is important because if auditors
facilitate the commission of a crime, then the ever-encroaching surveillance structures – the rhizoid assemblage – may be
justiﬁable, even at the cost of undermining the traditional notion of client conﬁdentiality. If, instead, auditors deter crime,Please cite this article in press as: S.D. Norton, Suspicion of money laundering reporting obligations: Auditor compliance, or
sceptical failure to engage?, Crit Perspect Account (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2017.09.003
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convenient tool in extending reporting obligations through the SARs system.
According to Morales, Gendron, and Gue Moore nin-Paracini (2014), a signiﬁcant body of accounting literature examines
the role of accountants in both detecting and preventing certain kinds of fraud. A dominant theme in this literature is that
fraud invariably results from lack of control; the role of the accountant is to foster effective oversight and cultivate skills in its
detection through forensic and internal auditing activities, and the introduction of systems by which opportunities to act
dishonestly are reduced. An example of systemic failure is provided by the collapse of Barings Bank in February 1995. It was
the notorious ‘ﬁve 80s account’which enabled Nick Leeson to circumvent internal control and audit safeguards to conceal his
trading losses. Effective internal auditing activities combined with proper systems of oversight would have reduced the
opportunity for his dishonest behaviour, andmay have avoided the bank’s subsequent demise. Training in fraud detection in
accordance with criteria set out in the COSO framework of 2012 also reinforces, at least in principle, the capacity of
accountants to address the risk of fraud (Hansen & Peterson, 2010). The framework explicitly includes a principle requiring
companies to consider the potential for fraud in assessing the risks they face (COSO, 2012, p. 78; Morales et al., 2014, p. 189).
On the other hand, the role of accounting in facilitatingﬁnancial crime, fraud, and corruptionhas beenwidely discussed in
the literature (Arnold and Sikka, 2001; Compin, 2008; Neu, Everett, Rahaman, & Martinez, 2013). Mitchell, Sikka, and
Willmott (1998) described the role of accountancy ﬁrms in facilitating the speciﬁc crime of money laundering. Formally
speaking, accounting is principally concerned with the recording of transactions and with identifying, and thereby
inhibiting, criminal behaviour. As Mitchell et al. (1998 p. 589) thus observe:
‘[A]ccountants routinely trade upon their claims of rationality, professionalism and “service of the public interest” to
secure or extend their monopolies (e.g. external audits), privileges and status. In this way auditors have colonized both
public and private sectors where their calculations routinely inform decisions about the allocation of goods and services,
including employment health and education’.
The argument is that auditors create complex transactions which can make identifying the origins and destinations of
illicit funds difﬁcult since although tasked with detecting and reporting such activity, they have difﬁculty in discharging this
obligation (Melnik, 2000). For Kerry and Brown (1992), money laundering is not generally conceived by ‘wicked individuals’;
‘Rather it is planned, executed, minuted and concealed in clean, respectable, warm and well-lit city centre ofﬁces’ (1992
p.594). Neu et al. (2013) describe how the ‘skilful use’ of accounting practices and the social interactions around those
practices enabled corruption (deﬁned as themisuse of public ofﬁce for private gain) to persist in the context of the Canadian
government’s Sponsorship Program (1994–2003), resulting in approximately $50 million being diverted into the bank
accounts of political parties, program administrators, and their families and friends. Money laundering requires constant
entries into and exits from the ﬁnancial markets, and criminal organisations have at their disposal ﬁnancial and accounting
specialists able to ﬁnd suitable fronts to circumvent national regulations and technical rules. Compin (2008) notes (p.594):
‘Accounting provides sophisticated support to the criminal approach and serves as a risk minimization tool. The
technique becomes the smokescreen, allowing ﬁnancial communications to be given a positive spin tomeet the required
standards’.
The paradox is that accountantsmay, for example, build corporate structureswith interlocking shareholdings on behalf of
a client, perhaps across several jurisdictions, to present an entirely lawful series of transactions to revenue authorities, but
throughwhich criminal fundswill subsequently ﬂow in the form of intra group dividend payments,management charges, or
inter-company loans at market interest rates. Recent UK legislation has required accountants to scrutinise these ostensibly
lawful structures for evidence of criminality and to report any suspicions to the NCA. However, ‘reasonable suspicion’ exists
across awidemental horizon, from an intuition that ‘something isn’t quite right’ to a near certainty that, based on objectively
evaluated facts, crime of some sort is being committed. The raw materials upon which the effectiveness of surveillance
depends are therefore derived from an array of sources, some of which may be more objectively certain, while others are
likely to be vague and less factually based. Suspicion is not determined by application of a mathematical process; the
surveillance assemblagemust extract and process diverse information to construct a coherent,mineable database accessible
by centres of control and oversight. The nature of this process of surveillance and its production of transferrable ‘data
doubles’ are considered next.3. Diverse surveillance and ‘data doubles’
Surveillance exists inmany forms from the direct and observable, for example cameras located at busy trafﬁc junctions, to
covert and unnoticed, where intelligence services tap phone calls, intercept mail, or scrutinise internet activity for evidence
of criminality. Individuals can ‘know’ they have been watched: a speed camera captures the car registration plate of a
speeding motorist, triggering a ﬂash in the rear view mirror. Or they can ‘suspect’ that they are being watched: a vague
intuition that a professional advisor has abrogated the conﬁdentiality principle and reported a criminal client to the police,
who are nowmonitoring through a host of technologies (Dandeker,1990; [91_TD$DIFF] Lyon, 2002). Finally, theymay not contemplate the
possibility that they have been subject to any scrutiny at all: for example, when a taxpayer’s ﬁle is reviewed for evidence of
‘red ﬂags’ of tax evasionwhich subsequently prove to be non-existent (Sikka & Hampton, 2005). The innocent taxpayer does
not suspect that his or her ﬁnancial affairs have been perused: why would they be? Scrutiny has been undertaken discretelyPlease cite this article in press as: S.D. Norton, Suspicion of money laundering reporting obligations: Auditor compliance, or
sceptical failure to engage?, Crit Perspect Account (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2017.09.003
4 S.D. Norton / Critical Perspectives on Accounting xxx (2017) xxx–xxx
G Model
YCPAC 2010 No. of Pages 11and unnoticed. In all of these contexts surveillance may be undertaken by single entities for a narrow purpose, or instead by
multiple agencies for data for further reviewacross amore extensive network. It may be centralised, focused and observable,
mirroring Bentham’s watchtower metaphor (Bentham, 1791, 1995), or it may be diverse, tacit, concealed and omnipresent.
Haggerty and Ericson (2000) suggest that a convergence of previously discrete surveillance systems has occurred, so that
they now constitute an emerging surveillant assemblage. They observe (p.606):
‘This assemblage operates by abstracting human bodies from their territorial settings and separating them into a series of
discrete ﬂows. These ﬂows are then reassembled into distinct “data doubles” which can be [92_TD$DIFF]scrutinized and targeted for
intervention. In the process, we are witnessing a rhizomatic levelling of the hierarchy of surveillance, such that groups
which were previously exempt from routine surveillance are now increasingly being monitored’.
Effective surveillance requires an interface between technology and corporeality, and is comprised of those ‘surfaces of
contact or interfaces between organic and non-organic orders, between life forms and webs of information, or between
organs/body parts and entry/projection systems (e.g. keyboards, screens)’ [93_TD$DIFF](). It requires an extensive network of
interconnected state agencies which constantly mine for, extract and exchange information derived from data ﬁled by the
multiple parties statutorily mandated to assist in this process. These networks have been likened by Deleuze and Guattari
(1987) to rhizomes or plants which spread in a creeping horizontal fashion across surfaces through interconnected vertical
root systems, in contrast to deep soil, single root plants which tend to develop vertically. In applying the rhizoid analogy to
the social space, Latour (1987) sees evolving networks of state centres of oversight and control as ‘scattered centres of
calculation’, in which information ﬂowing into a surveillant assemblage is reassembled and scrutinised ‘in the hope of
developing strategies of governance, commerce and control’ [94_TD$DIFF](). The person onwhom information is reported now has a data
double under constant scrutiny by multiple users. Haggerty and Ericson (2000 p.613) describe this situation:
‘Data doubles circulate in a host of different centres of calculation and serve as markers for access to resources, services
and power in ways which are often unknown to its referent’.
The purposes of data doubles remain undisclosed either to the ‘data double original’ or the ﬁlers of the information used
to build them (Poster, 1990). In Foucault’s panopticmodel founded upon Bentham’s watchtowermetaphor, the nature of the
relationship between overseer and overseen is transparent; information ﬂows are homogenous, and the range of potential
uses and users is limited and predictable. Central to themodel is the notion of enclosure; there is surveillance exercised from
a central point over a space bounded by physical parameters, for example bricks andmortar aswould be the case for asylums,
and mass production factories (Dandecker, 1990; Townley, 1994). The occupant of Bentham’s watchtower surveilled
prisoners walking in a courtyard for signs of breaches of prison rules, or secretive conversations preceding an anticipated
escape attempt (Bentham, 1791, 1995; Foucault, 1977). In contrast, in the rhizoid assemblage the information ﬂows are
diverse, multi-directional, and complex; multiple overseers use the information for an array of undisclosed purposes.
Information may be relevant in one context, for example suspected tax evasion, but irrelevant in another, depending on the
statutorily deﬁned purposes of the overseer. Ostensibly innocent tax avoidance via transactions between connected
companies may lead to further investigation for criminal activity such as money laundering if passed to a policing agency.
Relevance, and the way in which information is used, is in part determined by the nature and objectives of the agency
extracting and scrutinising it. This rhizoid assemblage exhibits greater complexity than Foucault’s hierarchical model, better
reﬂecting the near-limitless capacities of new technologies to extract, store, process and sharewith third parties information
drawn from across a fragmented landscape of overseers and reporters.
3.1. A rhizoid surveillance assemblage
Foucault’s model has been complemented in the recent literature by more diverse and less centralised surveillant
assemblages. Brivot and Gendron (2011) described the implications of new technology-based surveillance which
followed the introduction of a computerised knowledge management system in a Parisian tax/law ﬁrm. For them,
Foucault’s panoptic metaphor weakens when spaces are permeated with contemporary information technologies.
Technologies track a target’s behaviour, whether through on-line purchases, the covert monitoring of websites visited, or
the mapping of locations of mobile phone calls (Lyon, 2001). Overseers are ‘invisible’ in the sense that their locations,
monitoring processes and capacities are unknown to those being watched. People being watched do not even know how
many overseers have access to their online behaviour. For Poster (1997), digital databases result in a “superopticon” in
which subjects constantly produce surveillance data through their interactions with technological interfaces such as e-
mails and texts, generating a trackable digital footprint which, in some cases, is monitored by law enforcement agencies
for evidence of criminal behaviour (for example, visiting illegal websites on the ‘dark web’) (Gandy, 1993). Blogs and
social networking websites generate data on the proﬁle and behaviour of users, which may be collected by various state
agencies (Brivot & Gendron, 2011; Castells, 2001). The data has the advantage of permanence, and of difﬁculty of removal
once ‘posted on-line’. The targets of surveillance have also changed; the reduced cost associated with the mass storage of
information means that everyone can now be surveilled, not just the deviant and abnormal as was the case in 18th and
19th century asylums and correction houses. This perspective chimes with Quessada’s (2010, pp. 56–57) observation that
surveillance has become ‘ . . . light, discreet, immaterial and omnipresent’. Databases in which the mass storage of
information takes place facilitate this expansion of surveillance.Please cite this article in press as: S.D. Norton, Suspicion of money laundering reporting obligations: Auditor compliance, or
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and by whom, it will be later accessed and interpreted. Haggerty and Ericson (2000) discuss that police organisations
routinely access non-police databases such as those held by insurance companies and ﬁnancial institutions, and in the US,
the Federal NCIC [National Crime Investigation Center] police database that is linked to Social Security, Internal Revenue,
Passport, Securities and Exchange and the State Department (Stanley & Steindhardt, 2009). This process of consolidation of
information ﬂows and separate centres of information storage, alongside the widening classes of users and observers,
manifests a deepening and extending of the surveillant assemblage as described by Deleuze and Guattari (1987) and Lyon
(1994).
Information technologies mean that there is now no overtly central watching ﬁgure; instead, ‘Modern technologies of
surveillance are operated by an unstable collective of actors with a variety of agendas, each focusing on diverse targets of
control’ (Brivot & Gendron, 2011, p.140). For the surveillant assemblage to function effectively and efﬁciently in dispersing
data acrossmultiple centres of oversight, the transmission of informationmust be seamless and unobstructed, facilitated by
compliant and statutorily bound providers of that information. New technologies make this transmission possible,
unimpeded by physical or institutional boundaries.
3.2. Information ﬂows across unenclosed spaces
For Martinez (2011), with the advent of new information technologies, disciplinary control is exercised not within
institutional boundaries, but instead ﬂows throughout the open landscape. Martinez draws upon the framework of a society
of control by Deleuze (1992) which theorises that: (1) individuals do not necessarily move from conﬁned systems of control
to another, but instead across interconnected and continuous landscapes; (2) an emphasis is placed on communication and
information technologies that facilitate instant and continuous tracking of individuals throughout the open environment;
and (3) individuals are digitised and aggregated into large and multiple banks of information. Martinez argues that
information and communication technologies target the individual throughout the open environment instantly,
continuously and with heightened accuracy. Importantly, societies of control deconstruct boundaries so that information
is extracted from surveilled targets as they proceed across a relatively borderless landscape. Martinez observes (p,205):
‘In disciplinary societies, power is exercised across a network of heterogeneous institutional enclosures- each one
possessing its own self-enclosed monitoring system that envelops the targeted population in a homogenous disciplinary
effect. In contrast to this panoptic surveillance, it is proposed that contemporary systems of control are deployed from
various angles, overlapping each other, forming interconnected networks of information spread throughout the social
landscape. These networks are, moreover, composed of loosely connectedmodules andmonitoring devices that facilitate
mobility and surveillance across enclosures. The exercise of power is no longer conﬁned to an institutional setting but
exercised through the diffusion of previously enclosed logics of control across networks of information’.
Central to Deleuze’s society of control and Martinez’s targeting of individuals is the authority and legitimacy of state
agencies to demand information.1 Databases cannot exist in isolation, as they must be ‘fed’ by a multiplicity of statutorily
mandated data gatherers who compile, retain, and ﬁle in standardised form information which can be subsequently mined
by third parties with lawful authority (access) to do so. For Miller and Rose (1990, p. 8), laws are one of the principal
technologies ‘through which authorities of various sorts have sought to shape, normalize and instrumentalize the conduct,
thought, decisions and aspirations of others in order to achieve the objectives they consider desirable’.
Neu andHeincke (2004, p.181) propose that in prior historical periods, these technologieswere associated primarilywith
the security needs of the state. In this earlier context laws against incitement, conspiracy, and corruption provided for
criminal sanctions against those convicted of such offences. The authority of British ‘spymasters’ such as Queen Elizabeth I’s
Lord Walsingham was also rooted in laws, permitting any act deemed necessary for the protection of the state and the
gathering of information, including through torture. However, Neu andHeincke note that over time technologies and experts
were enlisted by the state to facilitate the governance of populations. This would have become necessary, for example, as the
Industrial Revolution of the late Eighteenth Century got underway in the UK. Themovement of peoples from rural areas into
towns and cities mademore complex the technologies used by the state tomaintain social order, to gather statistical data to
inform social policy, and to provide rudimentary support for the destitute, such as the Victorian Poor Laws. Now,
technologies such as accounting, administration, and law serve to structure the conditions of possibility within a particular
institutional ﬁeld. These techniques not only frame potential problemswithin the ﬁeld, but also construct possible solutions.
For Neu and Heincke, by mobilising distant knowledges and by transmitting this knowledge to centres of calculation,
technologies of government now facilitate the efﬁcient exercise of government froma distance. Information is gathered from
diverse centres by multiple, often unrelated agencies (in terms of statutory remits) possessed of the legal authority to
demand it. It must then be easily and smoothly transmittable across networks of communication to other agencies which
may then utilise it in furtherance of their own goals and agendas.
Accordingly, POCA 2002 authorises the extraction of information in the form of SARs and its transmission across a diverse
surveillant assemblage, assisted by the storage, processing andmining capacities of the new technologies. The legislation has1 It needs to be recognized that a range of commercial actors, today, are also involved in monitoring web behaviour (Viale, Gendron & Suddaby, 2017).
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have access to previously privileged information, whilst ﬁlers of SARs are protected, and their compliance with reporting
obligations encouraged, through so-called ‘safe harbour’ provisions. The extent towhich the dynamics of these relationships
have been affected by the legislation is evaluated in the following section.
4. Auditor reporting obligations under POCA 2002: legality versus practicality
The three main UK money laundering offences are contained in sections 327, 328, and 329 of POCA 2002, and are
punishable by a maximum prison sentence of 14 years and/or a ﬁne. Under section 327, an offence is committed if a person
‘conceals, disguises, converts, transfers or removes from the jurisdiction property which the person knows or suspects
represents the proceeds of crime’. Section 328 states that an offence is committed when a person enters into, or becomes
concerned in, an arrangement which they ‘know or suspect’ will facilitate another person to acquire, retain, use or control
criminal property, and the person knows or suspects that the property is criminal property. Section 329 provides that an
offence is committedwhen a person acquires, uses or has possession of property which they know or suspect represents the
proceeds of crime. Auditors are now statutorily required to continuously review their relationships with clients for any
evidence of ‘suspicious activity’ which, if identiﬁed, must be reported to the NCA through ﬁling of a SAR. This newly
established quasi-policing role is at odds with the traditional nature of the auditor-client relationship characterised thus by
the ICAEW in its ‘Response to Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) Regime: Call for Information by the Home Ofﬁce’, 25th
February 2015:
‘With some notable exceptions, accountants do not generally have experience of law enforcement or forensic work.
Whilst much of their work may well be investigatory, such investigations are rarely criminal. As such they may not
always form suspicions in a given scenario where a law enforcement ofﬁcer might. Greater access to data around
typologies and red ﬂags would help here, especially if law enforcement is to continue to rely on the private sector for
intelligence’.
For the [95_TD$DIFF] nstitute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales [96_TD$DIFF] (ICAEW hereafter), auditors have become conscripted
into the intelligence-gathering processes of the statewithout the necessary forensic tools or training.2 If this is true, this lack
of the appropriate skills-set represents a signiﬁcant practical impediment to effective execution of legal obligations. Under
the legislation, it is a criminal offence not tomake a disclosurewhen a suspicion has formed but, as noted in a Report from the
Information Commissioner to the UK Parliament (‘The Serious Organised Crime Agency’s operation and use of the ELMER
database. Information Commissioner’s Report to the House of Lords European Union Committee’), the legislation does not
deﬁne ‘suspicion’, a taskwhich is left to the courts. In the Court of Appeal case R v. Da Silva [2006] All ER 131, it was stated that
there should be ‘more than a fanciful possibility’ that a person is handling criminal property or involving themselves in
money laundering. A ‘vague feeling of unease’would not sufﬁce, but the lawdid not require the suspicion to be clear orﬁrmly
grounded, or based upon reasonable grounds. Ultimately, the legislation has resulted in the ﬁling of reports on a scale which
has overwhelmed the system (evidence in this respect is provided below), making the detection of crime less effective. The
ICAEW further comments:
‘The existing SARs report is primarily designedwith banks and ﬁnancial institutions inmind, not for accountants or in fact
any section of the regulated sector where suspicions are formed based on patterns of behaviour rather than speciﬁc
transactions. This is evident from sections of the SARs form requiring Credit/Debit information (the accountants
understanding of these terms derives from an entirely different angle), account numbers and information as to the date
the account was opened/closed. The report also assumes a single suspicious transaction is being reported rather than a
pattern. An accountant may also have very little information about the intended recipient of a transfer. Currently
accountants have to “shoehorn” their reports into this format’.
The legality of retention and mining of SARs has yet to be tested in court proceedings but in a Report by the Information
Commissioner to the House of Lords European Union Committee in 2011 on the Serious Organised Crime Agency’s operation
and use of the ELMER database, concernwas expressed that dissemination of information ﬁled could be in breach of the Data
Protection Act 1998, and the Human Rights Act 1998. Regarding the latter, a signiﬁcant risk remains of breach of Article 8 of
the European Convention on Human Rights, which gives every person the right to “respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence”. This concern has yet to be addressed by the Government. The nature of the statutory
reporting obligation as an instrument of bureaucratic control, and its displacement of professional judgement, is considered
next.
4.1. Auditor reporting and bureaucratic control
In a Guidance Note issued by the NCA in September 2016, ‘Submitting A Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) within the
Regulated Sector’, the following ﬁling obligation is stipulated:2 Note that historically, ﬁnancial auditors have changed their mind quite frequently regarding the extent to which they assume responsibility for
etecting fraud (Humphrey, Moizer & Turley, 1992).
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2000 (TACT) to submit a SAR in respect of information that comes to them in the course of their business if they know, or
suspect or have reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting, that a person is engaged in, or attempting, money
laundering or terrorist ﬁnancing. A SAR must be submitted as soon as is practicable’.
The Guidance Note provides that according to section 7 (1) of the Crime and Courts Act 2013, the disclosure of information
to the NCA will not breach any obligation of conﬁdence the auditor may owe to a third party or any other restrictions
(however they are imposed) on the disclosure of information. Section 29 of the Data Protection Act 1998 also provides
protection against the disclosure of information covered by the Act when the disclosure is made to the NCA.
In 2017 the ICAEW provided on its website examples of SARs which have signiﬁcantly contributed to successful
prosecutions. These include the following. A SAR reported that a limited companywas deliberately understating its business
income on its VAT (value-added tax) returns. HMRC (HerMajesty’s Revenue and Customs) conﬁrmed that the information in
the business records and that declared on its VAT returns did not match, resulting in a settlement of over £80,000. The
estimated beneﬁt was over £25,000. The VATevasionwas detected principally through information disclosed in the SAR. In a
further example, a SAR reported that a business owner had been depositing large cheques and round sum amounts of cash
into their personal savings account. The payments appeared to originate from the business butwithout formal recognition in
the accounts. AnHMRC investigation secured an admission by the trader that they had been under-declaring sales for several
years, resulting in a settlement of just under £40,000. Information contained in the SAR secured this outcome. Finally, in the
course of conﬁscation proceedings a defendant was attempting to thwart court processes by claiming that properties were
the assets of his current partner and former partner and not his own. The SAR showed that the defendant was trying to sell a
restrained property without seeking the permission of the court, conﬁrming that it was in fact his own.
The NCAwebsite (http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/) ‘About us- what we do’ page states that upon receipt, SARs
are logged onto the United Kingdom Financial IntelligenceUnit (UKFIU) internal SARs database (ELMER). SARs can lead to the
instigation of new investigations or enhance existing ones. There are approximately 1.5 million SARs on ELMER, which are
retained for six years or until proven not to be linked to crime. The website also explains that a single SAR is often used
several times by several different users for different purposes. For example, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs may draw
upon information contained in a SAR for evidence or leads relating to a tax investigation. Local police may use it in
furtherance of a fraud or theft investigation, without necessarily disclosing or directly citing it should court proceedings
follow. It is also unclear whether or not the SAR itself would be disclosed to a defendant’s lawyers as part of the advanced
disclosure procedural rules in preparation for a criminal trial. Finally, the NCA also indicates that SARs may be used by a
government department for statistical analysis to inform policy.
The UK Home Ofﬁce Circular 022/2015 titled ‘Money laundering: the conﬁdentiality of [103_TD$DIFF]Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs)
and the identity of those who make them’ states that the exercise of law enforcement powers can lead to the disclosure of
SARs in civil proceedings. This is more likely to arise in civil recovery proceedings undertaken by the NCA under matters
assigned to it under POCA, and HM Revenue and Customs. If the cause for suspicion reported by the auditor proves
unfounded, other relevant agencies with access to ELMER may take the investigation in a different direction from that
initially envisaged by the ﬁler, at which point the information passes across a wider surveillant assemblage.
Power (1997) and MacLullich (2003) identify the risk inherent in the increased use of auditing as a key mechanism of
bureaucratic control in support of capitalist regimes of truth. MacLullich (p. 796) observes:
‘Professional judgement is constructed as a largely technical task based on rationalised procedures where other forms of
knowledge are subjugated and emotional expression suppressed’.
The point is that auditors may become ﬁxated on generating indicators of best practice and bureaucratic compliance
rather than focusing on exercising substantive judgement. As a result of the processes of ﬁling and reporting as stipulated in
the legislation, risk may become the main concern, prioritised over the actual exercise of informed discretion (Ponemon,
1990). The Home Ofﬁce ran a Call for Information on the operation of the SARs regime in 2015, and noted in its Findings the
following themes deduced from responses from the reporting sector:
‘The reporting sector has concerns regarding the phrasing of the requirement to report suspicious transactions, as set out
in POCA. This concern, and the penalties for failure to report, drive a signiﬁcant level of defensive reporting,where reports
are made more because of concerns regarding a failure to comply with POCA than because of genuine suspicion. This
places a burden on the regime, and detracts from a focus on serious and organised crime’.
Processes of online reporting, the structure andmandatory ﬁelds of the SAR form, and ﬁling time limits all affect auditors’
daily work. As a profession they are ‘watched’ by the NCA via the monitoring of reporting compliance, and the compiling of
statistics to inform future policy. The auditor’s behaviour is affected because he or she will commit a criminal offence if
information (that raises reasonable suspicion) relating to the client’s conﬁdential ﬁnancial affairs is not ﬁled in a SAR. The
client is also ‘watched’ (or perhaps suspects that he or she is being watched, when in fact this may not be the case) because
the professional advisor may have reported on their behaviour without ﬁrst obtaining consent, such is the nature of safe
harbour statutory protection. The report may be subsequently mined by agencies for purposes unknown to either the client
or advisor after being ﬁled in the database (Giddens, 1990; Gordon, 1987; Staples, 1997). Anti-money laundering legislation
thus reﬂects state interposition into a nexus of relationships via a process ofmandatory reporting and storage of data for later
access by amultiplicity of agencies. Auditor reporting becomes a tool of bureaucratic control throughwhich data is gatheredPlease cite this article in press as: S.D. Norton, Suspicion of money laundering reporting obligations: Auditor compliance, or
sceptical failure to engage?, Crit Perspect Account (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2017.09.003
8 S.D. Norton / Critical Perspectives on Accounting xxx (2017) xxx–xxx
G Model
YCPAC 2010 No. of Pages 11and offered up to the NCA but not necessarily with much prior reﬂection; professional judgement may be displaced by the
need to comply with process. The SAR ﬁling obligation in the UK, and its database, ELMER, represent the automation of this
process, absented of human interaction at the web-based portal interface. However, several impediments exist to the
extension of the surveillant assemblage into the auditor-client relationship, principally relating to technological failings and
limited engagement with the reporting system as evidenced by declining numbers of annual SARs ﬁled.
4.2. Technological failings and auditor non-engagement
Neu and Heincke (2004) describe how ‘technologies’ comprising laws and regulations as well as ﬁnancial and monetary
relations intersect with techniques of force, but tend to fail to achieve their stated objectives. The authors identify ‘the
eternally optimistic but perpetually failing nature’ of such technologies. Miller and Rose observe (1990, p.11):
‘Technologies produce unexpected problems, are [97_TD$DIFF]utilized for their own ends by thosewho are supposed tomerely operate
them, are hampered by underfunding, professional rivalries, and the impossibility of producing the technical conditions
that would make them work . . . ’.
Technological effectiveness requires smooth interfaces between the system itself (i.e. the database) and the ﬁlers of
information. Where practicable, the latter should provide information which is homogenous in form and substance.
However, in the context of the accountancy profession generally, the NCA has stated that the sector is ‘one of the most
fractured in terms of membership of professional bodies, making compliance with the Money Laundering Regulations of
2007 more difﬁcult to enforce’ (NCA Report, National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime 2015). This
fragmentation causes problems in surveillance andwith the enforcement of harmonised standards (Cooper & Robson, 2006).
In a report produced by theHouse of CommonsHomeAffairs Committee, ‘Proceeds of Crime. Fifth Report of Session 2016/170,
the following criticism was made of the SARs system:
‘Wehave become deeply concerned for some time that the ELMER system for Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) is heavily
overloaded and therefore rendered completely ineffective. The ELMER system currently processes 381,882 SARs [last
year] despite being designed to manage only 20,000 [yearly] and, of this ﬁgure, only 15,000 looked at in detail. We have
reminded the Government time and again that it must be replaced. The failure of ELMER has made the SARs system a
futile and impotent weapon in the global ﬁght against money laundering and corruption’.
Auditors now ﬁle information in order to be fully compliant with the law, however trivial and unsubstantiated that ﬁling
may be. Consequently, it has become very difﬁcult for state agencies to follow up and investigate all the suspicions disclosed
in SARs. The ICAEW noted that from October 2014 to September 2015, the NCA reported that 381,882 SARs were submitted,
an increase of 7.82% on the previous year. The largest number of reports came from banks (83.39%), while accountants and
tax advisors ﬁled 1.21% of reports. The ICAEW observed in a comment in a newsletter dated 7th March 2016 titled ‘National
Crime Agency publishes [103_TD$DIFF]Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) annual report’:
‘The report does note speciﬁcally though that of the 4618 SARs made by accountants and tax advisors, these were
submitted by a total of 1487 individual entity reporters. Simple maths then gives an average of just over 3 reports per
reporter. However, these numbers have to be taken in context. In the UK, taking all the accounting and tax bodies together
and adding in all the other accounting service providers who are supervised by default byHMRC, there are probably in the
region of 25,000 entities in the sector. The number of SARs made therefore represents about 1 per annum for every 6
[accounting] ﬁrms or, alternatively, almost 95% of ﬁrms do not make any reports’.
The ICAEW suggests that there may be several reasons for the low level of ﬁling, including excellent risk assessment,
client engagement and other ﬁrm procedures to avoid ﬁnding itself having to submit a SAR. Equally, it may be due to a lack of
diligence among principals and staff, or a failure to keep up to datewith training in the area of money laundering legislation.
According to NCA statistics issued in its Annual Reports for 2012–2015, of all the SARs submitted by sectors including credit
institutions (by far the largest ﬁlers), independent legal advisors, estate agents and trust or company service providers,
accountants ﬁled 2.06% in 2012, 1.71% in 2013, 1.39% in 2014, and 1.21% in 2015. Between October 2013 and September
2014 the number of SARs submitted by accountants and tax advisors fell by 18.7% in comparison to 2012–2013, when most
other sectors reported on by the NCA showed positive increases. Similarly, betweenOctober 2014 and September 2015, there
was a decline in SAR submissions of 12.9%, when most other sectors showed increases.
These statistics bear out the ICAEW’s observation that accountants do not appear to be wholeheartedly embracing the
reporting system established by POCA 2002. This leads to a further paradox: while the total number of SARs ﬁled and
reported in annual NCA reports has increased dramatically during these years (278,665 in 2012, 316,527 in 2013, 354,186 in
2014, and 381,882 in 2015), overwhelming the ELMER database according to the House of Commons Home Affairs
Committee Report of 2015, reporting by the accountancy profession has remained almost static and at a signiﬁcantly lower
level than other sectors. This in spite of the fact that, according to the UK’s National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering
and Terrorist Financing published by theHomeOfﬁce in late 2015, the professionwas listed as high risk, second only to banks
in terms of facilitating criminality. Evidence produced in statements to the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee also
suggests that even this minimal level of reporting relates more to token compliance and the avoidance of criminal sanctions
rather to real suspicions of criminal activity. The Committee cited in its Report (at p12, para 22) concerns expressed by
Laurence Sacker, Partner, Corporate Finance and Money Laundering Reporting Ofﬁcer at UHY Hacker Young LLP that hisPlease cite this article in press as: S.D. Norton, Suspicion of money laundering reporting obligations: Auditor compliance, or
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having met their statutory requirement and that investigators “probably only look in detail at the consent SARs that go to
them, which is about 15,000 in a year. The others are just recorded somewhere and may get passed on eventually”.
Fundamental problems remain in the legalistic interpretation of ‘suspicion’, a concept not deﬁned in the legislation, and a
reporting system which seems to focus on individual transactions (bank-centric) rather than the series of transactions
approachwith which accountants are familiar. This differencemay be exacerbated by a standardised online formwith ﬁelds
which fail to reﬂect these nuances between different reporting sectors. Another possible reason for the relatively low level of
ﬁling is accountants’ well-known propensity to align with their clients’ interests, in order not to compromise the inﬂux of
professional service fees. This has been described by Malsch and Gendron (2013) who identiﬁed an ongoing dialectic, in
terms of prioritisation, betweenprofessionalism and commercialism. They citeMoore, Tetlock, Tanlu, and Bazerman (2006 p.
10) whomaintain: ‘Accountingﬁrms have incentives to avoid providing negative auditing opinions to themanagerswho hire
them and pay their auditing fee’. Audit can generate a conﬂict of interest between social service professionalism on the one
hand, and the inﬂuence ofmercantilism on the other. The ﬁling of a SAR represents a prioritising of the former over the latter,
and accordingly will be approached with caution if a consequence may be the loss of a client’s trust who suspects that
information has been passed on to a third party. Commercial self-interest sometimes outweighs a wider sense of
professionalism. This view corresponds with that of Picard et al. (2014) who examined the relative cultural shift from social
service professionalism to mercantilism or commercialism in the accounting profession, based upon consideration of the
promotional brochures used by the Ordre des comptables agréés du Québec (Institute of Chartered Accountants of Québec),
over the last 40 years, to attract new members.
5. Conclusion
As this paper has discussed, at ﬁrst glance the extension of auditor reporting obligations under POCA 2002 reﬂects an
evolving rhizoid surveillance assemblage comparable to that described in sociological literature by Deleuze and Guattari
(1987), Deleuze and Foucault (1977), Haggerty and Ericson (2000), and Giddens (1990). The concern has arisen that data
mining of ELMER by ‘authorised end users’may result in the information ﬁled by auditors emerging in entirely different and
unforeseen locations and juridical contexts, for example in tax evasion court proceedings against a client or disputedwelfare
claims, or in police prosecutions. The ongoing compilation of ELMERevidences elements of the architecture of the surveillant
state described by Lyon (1994), Nock (1993), Gordon (1987), and, of course, Orwell (1949); auditors now ﬁle information
through SARs which then becomes available to unknown users and for unpredictable uses. If a client is notiﬁed by third
parties with access to ELMER of pending investigations which only information known to the auditor could have triggered,
then they will know (or suspect) that the auditor provided the information, without authorisation or notiﬁcation.
Consequently, the trust and conﬁdentiality implicit in the professional relationship risks being compromised. The link
betweenmoney laundering and terrorist activity is, and will remain, of concern to legislators, and POCA 2002 represents an
attempt to dissuade auditors, through fear of criminal sanction, from participation in processes and structures which make
these crimes possible (Davis, 2003). However, in practical terms, the reporting regime ushered in by the Act has signiﬁcant
shortcomings. The technology underpinning the regime received signiﬁcant criticism in the Proceeds of Crime Report issued
by the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2016–17:
‘To repair the damage to the reputation of the SARs regime caused by the failure of ELMER, we recommend that the
Government involves those who actually use the SARs system to make reports- as well as those charged with
investigating at the other end- in designing the replacement to ELMER. Only by doing so can the Government rebuild
industry’s trust in the regime and ensure that the next generation of SARs does not suffer the same fate’.
The existing database technology lacks the capacity or capability to deliver on the development of the rhizoid surveillant
assemblage envisaged by Brivot and Gendron (2011), Haggerty and Ericson (2000), and Giddens (1985). Annual empirical
evidence from theNCA also strongly suggests that auditors are not engagedwith the reporting system as the quantity of SARs
they ﬁle appears to be either static or declining, unlike that of other reporting sectors such as banks and legal advisors.
Several reasons have been suggested for this shortfall, but the statistical indicators might have been expected to indicate an
increase in the number of SARs ﬁled given the ‘high risk’ status of the profession vis a vis other reporting sectors (Lehman and
Thorne, 2015; Mitchell et al., 1998; Neu, Everett, & Rahaman, 2015; Reinstein, Moehrle, & Reynolds-Moehrle, 2006).
The evidence suggests that auditors have not been ‘caught up’ in the surveillance assemblage to the extent which might
otherwise have been envisioned, given the wide reporting obligations of POCA 2002. The ELMER database, which was
originally intended to handle a signiﬁcantly smaller quantity of SARs, also appears to be struggling with ‘information
overload’. The Act does not have a de minimis rule, as evenwhere there is a low level of suspicion, and even if that suspicion
relates to possible commission of a trivial criminal offence, auditors are still obliged toﬁle a SAR. The recommendation by the
Information Commissioner to the House of Lords European Union Committee in 2011 that consideration should be given to
amending POCA 2002 to include a de minimis exclusion was rejected by the Government on the grounds that it would be
unworkable. Thewider legal architecturewithinwhich ELMER and the SARs ﬁling obligation operates, particularly regarding
human rights and data protection, will continue to present challenges to auditors when considering the extent of their
reporting obligations and ‘squaring’ these with the traditional duty of client conﬁdentiality as well as pressures not to
compromise the ﬁrm’s fee generation.Please cite this article in press as: S.D. Norton, Suspicion of money laundering reporting obligations: Auditor compliance, or
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‘suspicious activity’ has resulted in a low reporting threshold, exacerbated by an absence of a de minimis rule. This has
overloaded the ELMER database, and anecdotal evidence in responses to Parliamentary enquiries indicates that a signiﬁcant
proportion of SARs are not investigated. Minor legislative amendment, or more realistically, detailed and speciﬁc guidance
by the professional bodies to their members, is therefore necessary to clearly deﬁne terms, thereby reducing the deluge of
ﬁlings which is blocking up the system. The introduction of a de minimis rule should also be revisited. Second, the annual
statistical evidence provided by the NCA evidences a limited engagement on the part of the accountancy professionwith the
SARs reporting system. The on-line ﬁling process comprises a standardised formwhichmust be completed by bank ofﬁcials,
estate agents, legal advisors, and of course auditors, but with ﬁelds which do not account for nuanced differences between
grounds for suspicion. Importantly, some professions are ‘event’ focused, such as banking where, as an example, moneymay
pass into an account from an offshore location; but in others, such as audit and legal, suspicion sometimes only ariseswhen a
series of transactions has been executed. In this latter context it is the whole, and not the individual parts, which triggers
suspicion. Reformulation of the ﬁelds of the SAR form to reﬂect nuanced differences between reporting sectors regarding
grounds for ‘suspicion’ may make ﬁled data more speciﬁc, more relevant, and more readily minable by authorised third
parties. Finally, by linking failure to report suspicious transactions, however trivial, with serious criminal repercussions,
legislators have demonstrated a scepticismof the ability of auditors to exercise professional judgement. They therefore deem
that a ‘big stick’ in the form of the threat of imprisonment is required to encourage compliance. This approach appears to
have failed, however, as evidenced by NCA statistics as well as in responses to Parliamentary enquiries into the effectiveness
of ELMER. This points to important limitations in regulatory capacities to impact human agency.
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